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Calm stability in times of crisis
the public debate on the European Union through lectures at 
Leiden University, delivered by prominent external speakers. 
The first Europa Lecture was given on 12 June 2013 by 
Mr Radosław Sikorski, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Poland, and was entitled: ‘Poland, the Netherlands and the 
EU - Common Challenges’. The second Europa Lecture, 
‘Mededinging: hart van de Europese zaak’ (Competition: the 
heart of the European cause), was given on 14 May 2014 by Dr 
Alexander Italianer, Director-General for Competition of the 
European Commission. 
The lecture by the President of the European Council offers a 
new highlight in our lecture series. Following the lecture, Rector 
Magnificus Carel Stolker presented Herman Van Rompuy with 
the William of Orange medal, the highest distinction awarded by 
Leiden University ‘in recognition of your great contribution to 
the European project and out of admiration for the exemplary 
and inspiring energy with which you have steered the European 
Union through consecutive storms’. 
I trust you will enjoy reading this lecture and look forward to 
continue our promising Europa Lecture series. 
Stefaan Van den Bogaert
Director Europa Instituut
Preface
On Friday 10 October 2014, Herman Van Rompuy, former 
President of the European Council, delivered the third Europa 
Lecture in the Groot Auditorium of the Academy Building, 
Leiden University. 
It has been a tremendous honour for the Europa Instituut 
that the President of the European Council, a position only 
established following the Lisbon Treaty, chose Leiden as the 
place to reflect, at the conclusion of his term of office, on 
his five years as the first ‘European President’. In his lecture, 
which bore the appealing and also characteristic title ‘Rustige 
vastheid in tijden van crisis’ (Calm stability in times of crisis), 
Van Rompuy took us behind the scenes of the functioning of 
the European Council and the President’s role in this process. 
He focused on two ‘major events’ of the past five years, the 
euro crisis and the crisis in Ukraine. At the close of the lecture, 
he also looked ahead, identifying some of the challenges his 
successors will have to face … 
The Europa Instituut of Leiden Law School launched the 
Europa Lecture series in 2013 to mark its 55th anniversary. 




Calm stability in times of crisis
Thank you for your kind words and for your invitation to 
speak here today. I myself am an alumnus of the University of 
Leuven, and we always regarded Leiden as a kind of sister uni-
versity despite the fact that we were established under totally 
different circumstances. The University of Leuven was founded 
in 1425 by papal bull (something from which you are no doubt 
glad to have been spared), while the University of Leiden (as I 
have just learned) was established in 1575 by William of Or-
ange. His motto, “Je maintiendrai”, is something which I have 
borne in mind throughout my political career. Although I am 
aware that it is the motto of the House of Orange rather than 
of William himself, in any case we have always held the Univer-
sity of Leiden in the highest esteem. I consider it an honour to 
be allowed to stand before you in this hall.
I have just come from The Hague, where we were received 
in the Trêveszaal, another place rich in history. “Trêves”, of 
course, means “truce”, which brings us back to the seventeenth 
century. Looking at the paintings on the wall there, I could see 
the close links between the Seven Provinces - incidentally the 
same Seven Provinces which, at that time, were referred to as 
“the Union”. Of course, this automatically turned my thoughts 
to that other Union with which I am rather more familiar and 
which will form the focus of our discussions here today.
The subject I have chosen is “calm stability” and everything I 
have done over the past five years. The term “calm stability” 
comes from a verse by Henriette Roland Holst, a Dutch poet 
with whose work I am very familiar. During my time at high 
school, she was very warmly recommended by the Jesuits be-
cause she had taken the step from socialism to faith - a step 
which is not in itself contradictory. While I am aware that 
Dutch traditions have changed greatly since then, the fact is 
that in any case she entitled her poem “calm stability”. When it 
comes to sharing my experiences over the past five years, there 
is of course a risk of dropping into the anecdotal. I shall try to 
stop myself falling into that trap while at the same time avoid-
ing the other error of a tendency towards visionary thinking. 
You know what Helmut Schmidt once said about visionaries: 
“People who have visions should go and see a doctor”.
Ladies and gentlemen, I was elected, or designated - I shall 
leave that to your imagination - on 19 November 2009. I can 
scarcely believe that almost five years have elapsed since then. 
On that occasion I made a sort of introductory statement, 
which I took the opportunity to reread when preparing this 
speech. It is seldom that one can look back at a text written a 
number of years ago without blushing or feeling ashamed at 
one’s efforts. 
What I did say then was that I saw my task as that of a 
“bridge-builder” - a phrase which, of course, has since been 
endlessly repeated. I also said that “in my opinion, every coun-
try should emerge victorious from negotiations; a negotiation 
that ends with a defeated party is never a good negotiation. As 
President of the Council, I will listen to everyone and ensure 
that our deliberations yield results for all parties”. I added that 
“much has been said about the profile of the President of the 
Council, but only one profile is possible, and that is one of 
dialogue, unity and action. The image of the Council is based 
on the results achieved”.
This all sounds very simple, but there was much prior debate 
about what kind of person the President of the Council should 
be. Some wanted a charismatic figure (and that, of course, is 
what they got!). Others expressed a preference for someone 
who could lead from behind, who was in fact more skilled at 
concocting compromises (both possible and impossible), and 
who could guarantee results.
Ladies and gentlemen, the lawyers among you will by and 
large have read the Treaty on European Union, in its Lisbon 
version, and will have discovered that it describes the European 
Council and its President in nothing but the vaguest terms. 
The European Council must create momentum and specify the 
general orientations for Union policy. No further explanation 
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is given, and even less is said about the role to be played by the 
President of the Council, who was subsequently designated 
a “permanent” President. Now I’m not sure how you would 
define “eternity” or “permanence”, but to call a two-and-a-half-
year term of office “permanent” seems to be stretching things a 
little too far. That term of office may be renewed once only to 
make a total of five years, and those five years are now up. The 
European Council has become a body of central importance in 
the European construction, and the President of the European 
Council is both the leader and chair of that central body of 
heads of state or government within the Union’s institutional 
framework.
The European Council has gradually become more and more 
influential. It was established in 1974 based on an idea put 
forward by Jean Monnet. It is often forgotten that the father of 
the European idea and the Community method was also the 
inventor of what he then referred to as a “provisional European 
government”, that is to say the European Council (although 
that definition is not entirely accurate). At the time it was Pres-
ident Valéry Giscard d’Estaing who took the initiative of start-
ing regular meetings of heads of state or government.
The European Council meets on important occasions, for 
example in the event of amendments to the Treaties, on the 
accession of new members and whenever the EU budget has 
to be drawn up, and it has also gradually become a kind of 
appeals chamber for unresolved issues in other domains or at 
other levels of the Union. If no solution can be found, the mat-
ter is taken up at the highest level and it is the heads of state or 
government who have the final say. Meanwhile, the European 
Council has become more than just a crisis management body; 
it is in fact now responsible for setting out the Union’s main 
priorities in the years to come in terms of both economic 
and, increasingly, foreign policy, and its President is naturally 
bound by the objectives assigned to his institution. The whole 
situation is actually quite peculiar, because not only does the 
President of the Council have a short mandate (which, per-
sonally speaking, suits me fine, but I digress) - he also has no 
budgetary responsibility whatsoever. Moreover, he lacks the 
right to hire and fire - a key instrument for any politician. He 
therefore has no right of appointment, nor indeed any admin-
istration of his own. He has a very small staff of direct collab-
orators, roughly comparable in size (for the Belgians among 
you) to that of a Belgian state secretary: of course, by Dutch 
standards that is still substantial, but nevertheless it is in any 
case still a small number of staff in whom he has the utmost 
confidence and with whom he works on a daily basis, in addi-
tion (naturally ) to the Council Secretariat.
I do not wish to bore you any further; I merely wished to point 
out that the President of the Council has few formal powers. 
Everything he does or has the potential to do must be based 
on informal connections and informal means of exerting in-
fluence. From the very outset, we actually started to give an 
informal structure to matters that had not been placed on a 
formal footing. If one is seeking a consensus - and all but a 
few decisions are taken on the basis of unanimity, that is to say 
with the agreement of all 28 Member States - then at least two 
conditions must be met.
First, the President’s relations with his colleagues in the 
Member States must be based on trust; he must succeed in 
establishing with those with whom he is called to cooperate a 
connection that is not so much personal as loyal. The central 
quality required by any Council President is the ability to act as 
a guardian of trust. This quality, which likewise applies at local, 
provincial and national level, will also apply to my successors. 
Anyone who is responsible for managing a club must have an 
abiding bond of trust with those with whom he has to work 
on a daily basis. Such a bond is often established by means 
of very simple initiatives. I see the current President of the 
Commission, Mr Barroso, every week, discussing any problems 
with him every Monday morning, and we will maintain that 
tradition right up until the last day in October, when our work 
together will cease. I see the President of the Parliament once a 
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month, and I also hold monthly meetings with the group con-
sisting of the Presidents of the Central Bank, the Euro Group 
and the Commission in order to discuss economic policy.
Regular contacts are essential. Every year, I make at least one 
trip to each of the 28 capital cities of the Union in order to 
gain an understanding of where people live, to see them in 
their natural environment and to establish a direct connec-
tion with them. After all, the European Council is a special 
body. Whenever one sits in government and takes one’s seat 
on the first day, one knows that one is about to embark on a 
four to five-year journey with the four, five or six individu-
als who together make up the core cabinet of ministers in a 
Belgian context (and I am sure the situation is similar in the 
Netherlands). One will see one another almost to the point of 
tedium, but one knows that this is the club that is to govern the 
country. The same applies to the European Council, although 
in that case there are 28 fellow passengers. Of the 27 leaders 
who departed on that journey with me, only eight remain in 
the European Council. In the meantime I have seen in total 65 
individuals pass through its doors. It is therefore a club of var-
ying composition, so to speak. Now we are about to welcome 
four new prime ministers from Slovenia, Poland, Belgium and 
Sweden in the next European Council. The “club” is constantly 
changing and a bond of trust will have to be established with 
each and every one of those individuals. An ability to instil 
trust is therefore the main quality sought in a President of the 
European Council. Those of us who have spent our careers in 
politics are accustomed to this as we have had to put it into 
practice at every level of government.
Secondly (and this aspect was underestimated throughout the 
euro crisis), those who sit around the negotiating table must be 
“driven” (if I may use such an emotional term) by the spirit of 
compromise. No one person can be right alone; we must come 
together and seek agreement with each of the 28 parties. How 
do we do this? (Of course, over the past five years it has been 
thanks to the presence of a brilliant Council President, need-
less to say!) Most importantly, we have managed over the past 
30 or 40 years to see a culture of compromise accepted in the 
Union. Anyone taking part in a Council meeting knows that he 
and his colleagues will be bound by an atmosphere of give and 
take - not with a view to establishing a token compromise that 
will lead to nothing (which would have been of little comfort 
to us during the euro area crisis), but rather in order to seek an 
operational and workable compromise that takes account of 
every party’s individual sensitivities.
The most difficult thing I have had to do during that period 
is to reach agreement with those 28 members on a seven-year 
European budget - a budget that is shrinking, and hence small-
er than that which covered the preceding seven years. When a 
budget is increasing, it is not so hard to keep everyone happy. 
But in the case of a shrinking budget, we were able to maintain 
unanimity only by ensuring that every party could say they 
had won, while at the same time being fully aware that their 
own interests were subordinate to those of the EU as a whole. 
Without such an attitude, a body such as the European Coun-
cil would grind to a halt. We have proved that we are capable of 
reaching conclusions. If, at the time when the Union consisted 
of just six countries (that cosy club consisting of Benelux, West 
Germany, Italy and France), our forefathers had said: “Ladies 
and gentlemen” (or simply “gentlemen”, since there were no 
ladies in office in those days), “there will in future be 28 of 
you, and the Union will continue to function”, they would have 
been laughed out of court. Trust and compromise are therefore 
essential if progress is to be made.
The advantage and added value of a President of the European 
Council also became apparent during the euro area crisis; it 
has nothing to do with the personalities involved. I will prove 
this to you by posing a question. Imagine if we had had to 
manage the euro area crisis with six successive half-yearly 
Council Presidencies, with a new man or woman having to 
take up the reins again on each occasion in order to be able to 
take effective action at a time of crisis. The question answers 
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itself. The importance of the continuity of the mandate has 
become clear, in particular during the periods of crisis which 
we have experienced. It was some time ago that Mrs Merkel 
asked me: “Herman, what will you be doing between Council 
meetings? There are after all only four meetings a year - who 
else works full-time and has only four meetings a year?”. It is a 
question which I am no longer asked.
Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to illustrate the importance 
of the European Council with reference to two major events 
which have taken place in the past five years. The first is the 
euro area crisis, and the second is Ukraine. I have singled these 
out as examples not only because they dominated the agenda, 
but also because they may provide a good illustration of the 
lessons that can be drawn from the past five years. 
We have gone through not just a crisis, but an existential crisis 
of the euro area. At one point, the German Chancellor made 
the following comment (and I would like to underline the im-
portance of her words): “If the euro falls, Europe falls”. I would 
add, however, that if the Union falls, then so will the greatest 
peace project in the history of this continent and indeed be-
yond. I am not implying that everything we have done is of 
such historic proportion; rather, what I mean is that while we 
are busy discussing the “six-pack”, the “two-pack” and the cap-
ital to be invested in the European rescue fund, we are actually 
concerned with something much larger. In the midst of all the 
activities we are planning to undertake and the decisions we 
are preparing to make, we must always bear in mind the con-
text in which we are operating, the framework within which we 
are confined and why we are doing all the things we are doing. 
What, in fact, is the point of all our efforts? The answer is that, 
within a very short space of time, the history of the Union has 
become closely linked to that of the common currency. Conse-
quently, ensuring the euro’s survival has emerged as a prereq-
uisite for the continued smooth functioning (and some might 
even say the very existence) of the European Union itself.
We have thus also discovered just how interdependent we all 
are and how heavily we rely on one another. To give you just 
one example of this, the problems experienced by ten million 
people in Greece were relevant not only to the Greeks, but also 
to the 350 million other people using the common currency 
in the euro area. The President of China once said to me: “Mr 
President, please explain to me how things currently stand in 
Greece”. The leader of the world’s largest country, with 1.3 bil-
lion inhabitants, knew that his nation’s economic development 
and hence its current status were partly dependent on condi-
tions in a small country of just ten million inhabitants. This 
demonstrates the current strength of interdependence both 
within the Union and worldwide. Of course, I could provide 
many examples by way of further clarification, but suffice it to 
say that this existential discovery of interdependence is among 
the lessons learned by the Union in recent years. You might say 
that we were already aware of that fact on an intellectual level. 
Yes, of course we were, but when we are confronted with the 
reality it takes on an entirely new dimension.
Naturally, we have also discovered other truths which seem 
actually to have taken an unimaginably long time to enter our 
collective consciousness. For instance, we have realised that if 
one has a common currency, one must also have a common 
policy, or at least ensure that the various different policies 
are moving in the same direction. We introduced a common 
currency as an incredible political project, but paid too lit-
tle attention its economic aspects. In this case too, we were 
brought back down to earth by the reality. However, one of 
the most important lessons we learned is that throughout that 
period, and also in the years to come, what we needed (and 
still need) is not so much an ever closer union as an ever closer 
euro area. We embarked on our journey with the scantiest of 
requirements for an optimal currency area - the bare mini-
mum of preconditions for an Economic and Monetary Union. 
Although we have since raised the bar, we are still some way 
from where we need to be. We are still not a genuine Economic 
and Monetary Union. While we have taken important steps 
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towards banking, budgetary and economic union, we still have 
some way to go. We therefore need “more Europe”, not less, 
particularly in the euro area. We may need “less Europe” in 
terms of all forms of regulation, but with regard to the fun-
damental architecture of the Union, and certainly of the euro 
area, we need even more integration. We must simply accept 
the consequences of something which we all jointly desired 
and which has nothing to do with ideology - in other words, 
the common currency, which we christened the euro. The con-
tinued expansion of that concept is of very great importance. 
Hence “more Europe”, at least in that sense, is the inevitable 
logical consequence of our past actions.
Since I find myself in academic surroundings, I must raise 
another topic that is the subject of frequent discussion: in the 
course of the past five years, has there or has there not been a 
shift in influence towards what may be referred to as the “inter-
governmental” path, to the detriment of the “real” Community 
institutions, such as the Commission and the Central Bank 
- the genuine institutions of the Union per se? To a certain 
extent, such a shift has indeed taken place, but in this case too 
there is an explanation that has nothing to do with a power 
struggle or indeed any kind of ideological “Europeanism”. So 
what has happened? We had to rescue Greece, followed by a 
number of other countries, and we had to build a firewall in 
order to convince the rest of the world that if any further prob-
lems arose elsewhere in the Union, we had the resources and 
financing necessary in order to respond appropriately, and that 
in the event of any new problems, we could provide the coun-
tries concerned with temporary assistance to help them make 
it through that difficult period.
But those resources were not available, and we had to build 
a lifeboat - indeed, rather more than a lifeboat - as the storm 
raged around us. And because the EU budget had set aside few 
resources for that purpose (the budget, while significant, ac-
counts for just 1 % of EU GDP), those funds had to come from 
national coffers. However, the heads of state or government 
then said: “That’s all very well, but this is our money, and we 
must therefore ensure that it’s spent wisely. We must have a say 
in how that money is spent”. So who should have such a say? 
The national finance ministers, of course, but ultimately the 
heads of state or government themselves, because of the very 
large amounts involved. A matter for those at the very top, so 
to speak. The European Council has thus gradually gained in 
influence as a result of the desire to ensure that control over 
the raising of funds from the national coffers, or in other 
words from national taxpayers, should remain in the hands of 
the heads of state of government.
At the same time, however, it has been said that this crisis 
must never be allowed to arise again. We have been far too lax 
over the past ten years of the euro’s history. We ought to have 
acted at a much earlier stage when things started to go wrong 
in terms of national economies and budgets, and we therefore 
require the resources to ensure and if necessary enforce a closer 
degree of supervision. Who is better placed to do this than the 
Commission, and who is more independent? We have therefore 
accorded greater powers to the Commission. We will soon see 
just how great the Commission’s influence can be, because over 
the next few days it will have to examine the budgets of all the 
Member States in order to ensure that they comply with the 
agreements reached within the degree of flexibility permitted 
by the rules. Moreover, we have accorded to the European 
Central Bank - albeit separately from its monetary functions - 
responsibility for supervising almost all banks in the euro area 
as well as those wishing to join the banking union. Hence the 
intergovernmental method has resulted in considerably more 
power for the Community institutions. This just goes to show 
that one can never dismiss an entire period by describing a 
situation in terms of slogans and one-liners. One must have an 
eye not only for nuance, but also for reality as a whole.
I am well aware that the European Parliament is not always 
happy to see power shifting away from the Union institutions 
to the Member States jointly. However, at a certain point we 
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faced the choice of either doing nothing (which was in fact not 
an option, since it would mean the end of the euro area and all 
the associated ramifications), or doing what we had to do, and 
in that case we initially had to work together with the Member 
States at the level of the European Council (at the time, we had 
no opportunity to discuss who was in the best position to take 
action). We were obliged to take a decision and to choose the 
method which I have just described to you. Hence the outcome 
was of the utmost significance, and I think that we took due 
account of the Union’s institutional balance.
Of course, sometimes we had to be creative (and it might be 
said that the Belgians are at times overly so), because problems 
arise and one is judged on the results achieved. During the 
discussions on Cyprus in the spring of 2013, for example, we 
faced the problem of a serious disparity between what had 
been decided by the parliament in Cyprus and what had been 
decided by the Eurogroup finance ministers in Brussels. In the 
normal scheme of things, the European Council would have 
had the last word. However, time was limited and there was the 
threat of a bank run on Cyprus; it was therefore a race against 
the clock. We did not even have enough time to convene the 
European Council. I then convened a meeting which is not 
described anywhere in the treaties.
It was composed of the President of the Eurogroup, the Pres-
ident of the Central Bank, the President of the Commission, 
the managing director of the IMF and, of course, the Presi-
dent of Cyprus and his most senior ministers. Just minutes 
before insolvency was due to be pronounced, we concluded 
an agreement in close contact with the Member States, which 
was subsequently sealed. We had to do the best we could with 
the means that were available - or, as our French friends would 
put it, the moyens du bord. This meant that we had to be very 
creative throughout that period. I could give you many more 
examples of occasions when, in the case of certain decisions re-
lating to the euro area, we first convened the European Coun-
cil and then took a break in order to meet among the prime 
ministers of the euro area and take decisions. We subsequently 
returned with those decisions to the full European Council 
- still in session - and went on to amend the decisions taken 
by the euro area leaders because they were not to the entire 
satisfaction of other members of the Council. Eventually, we 
found a solution to the problem. Hence while it is true that the 
institutions must be respected, we were in a crisis situation and 
we had to proceed with a great deal of creativity, but without 
infringing the rule of law.
In Ukraine too we were faced with a situation without prec-
edent. In Crimea, borders were disregarded for the first time 
since the Second World War. Borders were always respected, 
even after the fall of the Berlin Wall - look at the Oder-Neisse 
line. It is a major crisis on the European continent, and we 
have been compelled to respond to it, particularly as the entire 
episode started with the European Union. The fact is that the 
former Ukrainian President was unwilling to sign the Asso-
ciation Agreement that had already been initialled. This gave 
rise to the Maidan uprising, which led to the destabilisation 
that followed. We were thus on the threshold of a major crisis, 
especially once the borders laid down after the war were dis-
regarded. As a result, we were compelled to respond, and we 
responded as a body of 28 countries, aware that sensitivities 
within the Union were very different, the economic interests 
were different, the neighbourhood was different, the history 
very different. So too, in many cases, was the willingness, or 
unwillingness, to enter into a confrontation. Each time, howev-
er, we succeeded in taking decisions unanimously, including in 
the difficult debate about sanctions and the rest. Without that 
unanimity we would never have made an impression on those 
with whom we were in conflict, and we could never have con-
cluded the interim agreements that we have now concluded.
There too, however, we had to do things at an institutional lev-
el that we had originally not anticipated. We had initially said 
that the sanctions were a matter for the highest echelons, and 
were so important that they could not be implemented even 
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by the Foreign Affairs Ministers, but only by the leaders. The 
final decision was to be taken at the highest level because so 
many economic and political interests were at stake. As tragic 
fate would have it, when the aircraft carrying so many of your 
countrymen was dramatically brought down, it was at that 
point no longer the leaders who had to take the decision - it 
had become all too apparent that we had to act, and so - de-
spite the fact that we were in the middle of the holiday season 
- the decision was taken at ambassadorial level. Because it had 
become all too apparent that we had to act, what had initially 
to be decided at the highest level was subsequently decided at 
the level of the Permanent Representatives.
The Union is a living entity, not a set of institutions whose 
interrelations are permanently fixed. No, the Union is a living 
entity, and not only is the President of the Council (and this 
must also apply to my successor) the President of the 28 coun-
tries that have to gather round the table seven or eight times a 
year, but he also has to be the one who, where possible, steers 
the institutions themselves in the right direction. The Europe-
an Commission, the Eurogroup dealing with problems in the 
euro area, the European Parliament to the extent that he is able 
or allowed to influence matters...; in any event, he must ensure 
that there is no rivalry between the institutions, rather that the 
institutions all serve the general European interest. That might 
sound a little high-flown but it is the case, nevertheless. The 
worst that could have happened to us is that during a major 
crisis either in the area of foreign policy or involving the euro, 
we would have been faced with a conflict between the institu-
tions. That did not happen, nor must it be allowed to happen 
in the future. That is why consultation, trust and compromise 
are of tremendous importance here too.
Some say: “Yes, but such a European architecture is highly 
complex”. I could answer that by saying that countries with 
a very simple institutional architecture do not always find it 
easy either. In the United States there is a single president and 
a bicameral parliament. I haven’t looked at the timeline, but I 
think that it took over a year to reach agreement on a budget. 
Hence it is not because there is a simple structure that the 
structures work. And even at the level of the Union I could, 
with a little goodwill, say that we also have a kind of separa-
tion of powers. In fact, the European Council acts as a kind of 
collective head of state. Not the President of the Council, but 
the Council as a whole. With the same degree of goodwill, I 
could say - not entirely correctly, but I’m trying to present it 
schematically - that the European Commission plays the role 
that the governments play, especially governments as we see 
them in the French tradition; this makes the European Council 
and the Commission “the executive couple”. And, of course, we 
have a European Parliament that since the Treaty of Lisbon has 
had competence in all areas, whereas until ten years ago its sole 
competence was for part of the budget. And naturally there 
is also the Court of Justice of the European Union. Thus the 
architecture is not at all as complex as people wish to present 
it. Obviously, for those who dislike institutions, complexity is 
always a convenient argument but that is not the case. We live, 
it goes without saying, in peculiar times, and the complexity of 
the structure is the least of the criticism.
The European idea has suffered in recent years. There is a loss 
of trust but one must also ask the question: Is the crisis sur-
rounding the European idea and the loss of confidence in the 
institutions a phenomenon confined to Europe, or is it broader 
than that? It is a broader phenomenon. In many countries the 
rise in populism of all kinds dates from before the financial cri-
sis and from before the euro area crisis. I come from a country, 
from a region where a racist party received 24 % of the votes in 
2004. That had nothing to do with the economy, nothing to do 
with the euro area crisis and nothing to do with the financial 
crisis. Ten years ago the Front National was already the second 
largest party in France. The person Jacques Chirac, the French 
President, had to face in the 2002 presidential elections was Le 
Pen senior, who had achieved second place in the first round; 
he received 18 % of the votes and, after seven years in office, 
the French President achieved less than 20 %. The difference 
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was that small. So, generally speaking, there is what we can, for 
the sake of convenience, call a crisis “of politics”, and that does 
not date from yesterday. 
The euro area crisis contributed to it and speeded things up in 
some countries, but it is a much more fundamental crisis than 
just a European one. It relates to practically all institutions. It 
is above all not merely a question of politics but also of soci-
ety. In an increasingly individualistic society (and that is not 
a value judgment), the fact is that fear is something that can 
be spread more easily than in a strongly cohesive society. If 
large numbers of individuals are preoccupied with themselves 
for whatever reason, it is much easier to persuade yourself 
that your problem is the other’s fault; the “other” in the broad 
sense. The “other” who speaks a different language, comes 
from a different culture, is of a different colour, or is different 
in many other respects. It is also very easy to blame the “other” 
when one lives in a society that is profoundly marked by fear. 
And here Europe too can have a place. In some countries - but 
not in all, and not always with the same degree of intensity - 
Europe is identified with “the other”, and as something that can 
easily be seen as the enemy. In saying that, I do not wish to talk 
down the problem or put it in such a context that one becomes 
lost in it. I am merely saying that it is a problem that is much 
deeper and much more far-reaching than just Europe and the 
European Union.
We must therefore be able to perceive the European Union 
more as a place and less as a space. I would like to explain those 
concepts. By “place”, we mean protection, stability, solidarity, 
a nest, a home. By “space”, we mean not only the geographical 
space, but also the intellectual space, being able to travel and 
meet other people. It’s more about direction, speed, time, 
openness, movement and possibilities. Place and space are two 
different concepts and we need both. We need a nest, but we 
also want to fly. But after flying, we want somewhere to come 
home to. Human nature is actually very simple.
It’s no different with Europe. Europe is in fact based on the 
idea of space, on the concept of the free movement of goods, 
people and capital, on taking down borders, on the disappear-
ance of customs offices and foreign exchange offices, on being 
able to communicate everywhere, via telecommunications or 
by other means. The European space is a concept that is actu-
ally at the very heart of the European construction. It was all 
born with a more distant goal, but out of a kind of common 
market. Europe was never thought of as a home, a place, a 
“Heimat”, and to a certain extent we are paying the price for 
that today. There was a kind of unspoken division of labour: 
Europe had to create the possibilities and opportunities, and 
had to open up markets and market outlets for a population of 
what is now 500 million, the largest and most valuable market 
anywhere in the world. The division of labour was regarded as 
a matter for Europe, whereas protection, the welfare state and 
all manner of legislation were matters for national institutions. 
Both aspects were seen as positive, but globalisation and con-
tinued European integration have turned them in a different 
direction. What was seen as openness was at a certain point 
partly or even mainly perceived as a threat. What was seen as 
an opportunity came to be seen as something that can threaten 
my job and my position in the markets. The whole concept of 
an open world became a world in which the “other” was seen 
as an interloper, and Europe, friend of freedom and space, as a 
threat to protection and the place that one sought.
Naturally, such a view is not really sustainable, and the divi-
sion of labour is no longer feasible. We must start to see the 
European Union as much more than just a Union for those on 
the move, and those who have the opportunity to travel, do 
business and find a job elsewhere. The Union must also be for 
those who stay put, who remain at home, and who often feel 
themselves threatened very close to home. A Union not only 
for citizens with diplomas and a knowledge of languages, but 
for everyone. Not only for consumers who obtain the lowest 
prices, but also for producers who fear the possibility of unfair 
competition or social dumping, or who are worried that their 
13
Calm stability in times of crisis
jobs are under threat. We must strike a new balance. An ap-
propriate balance between home and “place” on the one hand, 
and “space” on the other. I could provide many examples to 
support this, but in any case the fact is that we must think care-
fully, both now and in the future, about fundamental values 
and about where the European Union’s core business lies. Does 
it lie only in those problems that the countries cannot resolve 
by themselves, and where the Union is necessary as a Union in 
order to offer sufficient protection - cross-border problems, 
to put it tritely? Migration is one such problem. On the other 
hand, we must also look at where the Union can actually play 
less of a role or even stop playing a role. This can involve all 
manner of topics: from the welfare state to regional traditions 
or local cheeses.
We must therefore consider what the Union’s core task is - and 
that debate is certainly going to take place in the future - with-
out us having to stoop to a new Treaty, because we spent seven 
years negotiating the last one. We have other things to do apart 
from discuss institutional changes. That debate is however 
conditioned by a broader goal, and the broader picture must 
always be kept in mind. Why are we doing all this? Because 
if Europe is necessary and confidence needs to be regained, 
it must try to reset the balance between those functions of 
place and space. I have interpreted that generally, a little pseu-
do-philosophically, but in any case that is my firm conviction. 
Rector Magnificus, Dean, Mayor, Your Excellencies, all who 
were kind enough to be here today, regaining people’s trust will 
be one of the great challenges in the years to come, and I am 
convinced that the Union’s new political leaders will take on 
that responsibility. I hope that you in Leiden will be able to fol-
low that closely. As I shall do after 1 December, as a spectator, 
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